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THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION OF
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN*
BRUCE ACKERMAN**

I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND COMMON LAW

Our legal heritage is rich, perhaps too rich. The modem judge looks
back to two traditions, each layered over with the work of centuries, each
intertwined with the other, but nonetheless distinct. The tradition of
Anglo-American common law nears its millennium, offering up a tangle
of craft and precedent from different eras. Compared to this, the tradition
of American constitutional law is adolescent. And yet it provides the
modem world's longest continuing judicial project in public law-one with
its own narrative structure, decisive precedents, and cautionary tales.
Given this embarrassment of riches, each judge, each era, must confront
its own task of integration: how to organize common law and
constitutional law into a meaningful whole?
Like the rest of his generation, Justice Harlan's quest for an answer
began with a negation. The New Deal revolution had repudiated a
synthesis that had been the crowning constitutional achievement of the
preceding generation. This early twentieth century synthesis affirmed a
deep continuity between the two traditions. American constitutional law
was but an aspect of a broader and deeper Anglo-Saxon struggle for a
distinctive language of liberty. The deep continuity of common and
constitutional law was expressed both narratively and substantively.
Narratively, the greatest events of American constitutional
history-the Founding and Reconstruction-were not presented as if they
represented sharp breaks with the common law tradition. Revolutionary
Americans fought the English, it is true, but they were fighting for their
common law rights as Englishmen. Similarly, the Civil War was not
understood as marking a sharp break in constitutional development.
Reconstruction merely served to deepen and universalize common law
commitments by guaranteeing "life, liberty and property" for all, not just
a privileged few. Rather than emphasizing large differences between the
two traditions, the student of constitutional law and common law supposed
them mutually complementary.
* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991).
** Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. Thanks to
Brennan Van Dyke and Greg McAndrew for their splendid research assistance.
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This is almost too weak a way of stating the relationship. The senior
partnership in the business of preserving Anglo-Saxon liberty was often
awarded to the common law. On an intellectual level, the triumph of
Darwinism had an enormous impact throughout the culture. Evolution, not
revolution; slow and unconscious adaptation, not self-conscious
institutional engineering, seemed the proper path of human development.
From this perspective, the slow and half-conscious methods of the
common law seemed more deeply rooted in the life of the community than
the efforts by Enlightenment Founders or Reconstruction Republicans to
usher in brave new worlds of constitutional meaning. However different
they may have been in other respects, the great constitutionalists of the
late nineteenth century-a Cooley or a Tiedemann or a Wilson'-could
agree on this: that the Founders and Reconstructers were far too optimistic
about the role of self-conscious constitutional construction in history; that
deeper changes occurred through evolutionary processes by which an
organic community adapted to imperfectly understood imperatives of
growth and development. The challenge was not to understand the
intention of the Framers of the original Constitution and its amendments,
but to grasp the ways in which these original understandings were
transformed by deeper organic imperatives. Holmes's great book, The
Common Law,2 was a model to be followed, not an example of a legal
genus radically distinct from constitutional law.
And yet, despite their skepticism about the roie of self-conscious legal
change in history, most lawyers, judges, and scholars of the period did not
find it difficult to detect a telos organizing the meaning of it all. 3
Common law and constitutional law were part of a larger saga, describing
the success of Northern European civilization in constructing a vibrant
alternative to the decadent Latin despotisms of the medieval and early
modem world. The story did not begin with the Founding or evdn the
Magna Carta's insistence on the common law writs. It began in the forests
of Northern Europe where Germanic tribes first tasted a liberty-loving
alternative to Roman despotism; it included the Protestant Reformation no
less than the American Revolution. The story often expressed a great deal
of ethnic pride in carrying on the Northern European Protestant heritage,
sometimes adopting the language of race: the study of the Constitution
1. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
(5th ed. 1883); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMANN, THE UNWRITirEN CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1890); WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
2. OvERW. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).

3. For all of Holmes's skepticism, his Common Law is rich in teleology. See HOLMES,
supra note 2.
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and the common law were but chapters in the great Teutonic or Aryan
struggle for human freedom.4
This synthesis, long under Progressive attack, dissolved in the
cauldron of the Great Depression and World War. After the New Deal,
the common law categories of contract and property no longer seemed at
the core of the constitutional language of freedom. To the contrary: the
beginning of constitutional wisdom was to grasp the ways in which
common law rhetoric might conceal oppressive inequality and coercive
monopoly. After the War against Hitler, it would be tough to root either
common law or constitutional law in a meta-narrative starring the Teutonic
race.
So much, at least, was obvious to the lawyers of Harlan's generation
as they returned from their exhilarating experience of military victory to
take up leadership positions in a transformed American government. But
out of these negatives might come many affirmatives-widely different
understandings of the proper relationship between constitutional law and
common law. When faced with the disintegration of the old synthesis,
John Harlan sougit to revitalize common law constitutionalism. Most of
his colleagues were skeptical, many downright hostile. They thought
Harlan was ignoring the verdict of history, as expressed in the
constitutional revolution of 1937; even more fundamentally, they thought
he was blinding himself to the special character of constitutional law.
Rather than repeating the mistake of Lochner v. New York, 5 they sought
forms of adjudication that would declare the Constitution independent from
common law methods and ideas.
These independent constitutionalists, as I shall call them, differed
greatly amongst themselves as to the methods of achieving their great
goal. For present purposes it is unnecessary to concern ourselves with
those Justices (if such exist) who aimed for independence by trying to
liberate themselves from the bonds of history. I am more interested in
describing an approach which is no less self-consciously conservative than
Justice Harlan's, 6 but which differs radically in its understanding of the
4. For a remarkably effective reassertion of the relevance of these broad themes, see
DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 4-5

(1989). My colleague Paul Kahn is recapturing the texture of late nineteenth century
constitutional theory in his forthcoming book. See PAUL KAHN, THE END OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (forthcoming 1992).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. In terms of Kent Greenawalt's useful trichotomy, the "conservatism". I have in mind
has to do with judicial method, not political and social philosophy. See Kent Greenawalt,
Justice Harlan's Conservatism and Alternative Possibilities, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 53
(1991). Indeed, insofar as the American constitutional system affirms liberal Enlightenment
values of individualism and egalitarianism, the effort to conserve these values will
predictably generate all sorts of problems for the political and social conservatism that
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tradition it proposes to conserve. This brand of independent
constitutionalism is most familiar in the work of Justice Black, but I will
be defining the approach more broadly to include many judicial7
performances of which Black himself would not have approved.
Similarly, my model of common law constitutionalism hardly exhausts the
importance of Harlan's judicial contribution. While Harlan displays his
common law sensibility in a bewildering diversity of contexts, there is
obviously much more to him, both substantively and methodologically,
than my simple model expresses. Rather than aiming for a complete
portrait, I hope to explore Harlan's work for help in our own effort to
work out a plausible relationship between the two traditions constituting
American law.
Which represents the sounder path for the future-constitutional
common law or constitutional independence? Obviously, the right answer
may not be one or the other. Judges may try to mix modalities in crafty
combinations. This article, however, contents itself with some broad
orienting remarks. I shall be presenting four reasons for thinking that
Harlan deserved to be in dissent-why the next generation should continue
down the path of the law marked by independent constitutionalism. I leave
to another time whether, consistently with this large conclusion,
independent constitutionalists might "selectively incorporate" some
Harlanesque techniques into their juridical repertoire, and if so, when and
how.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OR
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW?
My models will be comparing two approaches along three dimensions.
The first axis of comparison investigates alternative narratives through
which constitutionalists might seek to locate particular problems within
historical time. The partisans of independence emphasize a distinctively
American narrative whose high points are the Founding, Reconstruction,
and other historical exercises in popular sovereignty. The common law
narrative is more capacious: it does not begin with 1776 or 1787, but
Greenawalt describes. When political or social conservatives are appointed to the bench,
they will have to choose the kind of conservatism that is most important-do they want to
be judicial conservatives, and preserve the Enlightenment tradition of American
constitutionalism, or do they wish to be judicial activists, and repudiate Enlightenment
constitutional values to further their conservative political and social ideals? It is not clear
whether Professor Greenawalt recognizes the existence of this dilemma within conservative
thought.
7. As we shall see, Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), satisfies the model of independence no less than Justice Black's dissent
in that case. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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traces a social practice deeper into time, glimpsing the mythic realm I
shall call "time immemorial." Nor does it focus intensively upon a few
magic moments of constitutional creativity-the Founding or
Reconstruction or whenever. It is more concerned with a practice's
gradual evolution through long periods of time. Is marriage a fundamental
institution of our society? Don't ask the Framers. Consider that we have
lived with the practice since time immemorial and it continues to have
deep meaning for us today. Is fair criminal procedure a fundamental
value? Don't ask the Reconstruction Republicans. Governments have been
punishing people since time immemorial and judges have continually
strived for fairness against the repressive passions of the day. And so
forth. To summarize this first contrast, I shall say that the independent
constitutionalist's time frame has a definite beginning and emphasizes
crucial turning points, while the common lawyer's time frame has an
indefinite beginning and emphasizes evolutionary development.
Second, and not unrelated, are competing orientations to rationality.
For the independent constitutionalist, one cannot understand the Founders
or their great successors without recognizing that they were great gamblers
on the power of untested abstractions. Thus, the Founding Federalists
believed that Enlightenment political science allowed them to construct a
republic of unprecedented size and diversity; the Reconstruction
Republicans gambled on the federal courts making an unprecedented effort
to protect the fundamental rights of previously enslaved and subordinated
groups.
The common lawyer, in contrast, is deeply suspicious of
comprehensive efforts at institutional redesign. When put to the practical
test, these abstract projects are meaningless without the exercise of
practical wisdom by practical men and women steeped in the evolving
mores of social life. A thoughtful judicial decision will not be full of socalled theories of fairness or equality or democracy. It will be
accompanied by a sober enumeration of the particular' factors that
particular decisions bring into play.
Once the judge gets down to the facts of a case, only one thing will
be clear: it will be a miracle if substantial things cannot be said on both
sides of the dispute. This does not mean that a judge can't learn from
others in making up his mind. But the best place to look is in the books
of judicial opinions written by hard-headed common law lawyers, not in
the speculative excesses of constitutional lawmakers. Of course, no
common law case is like another. But judicious effort to respond rationally
to particulars will slowly add up to patterns of rational response. The
more these patterns are detectable across different times and places, the
more reasonable they will seem.
This leads to a third crucial difference between the independent and
common law constitutionalist: the identity of the model decision maker.
The independent constitutionalist focuses on people like the Founders who,
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after a generation of sacrifice and political effort, have gained the consent
of their fellow citizens to new principles of constitutional legitimacy. The
task of the judge is, first and foremost, to master these basic constitutional
principles and make them his guide in concrete cases.
For the common lawyer, this is to put the cart before the horse. After
all is said on both sides of the case, there will be no decisional algorithm
that can serve as a reliable guide. We should rely instead on the seasoned
judge with a sense of decency to sort the wheat from the chaff. It is he,
and not some group of politicians who have earned the popular authority
to speak for We the People, who is the true hero of our constitutional
order.
So much, then, for our competing models-of time, of rationality, of
paradigmatic decision maker. Whatever else they fail to capture, surely
they demonstrate that Justice Harlan exemplifies the type of judicial
character that the common law model places at the center of the
constitutional stage. He did not, like Justices Black or Warren, gain office
by succeeding in electoral politics; nor did he win his seat, like
Frankfurter or Douglas, in reward for academic or intellectual services
rendered to a victorious President; nor was his selection attributable, in
the manner of Justice Brennan, to a President's humdrum effort to fasten
marginal groups more firmly into his electoral coalition! Like Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Souter, he comes from the residual category of
judicial appointments: men (and hopefully, in the future, women9 ) who
are "leaders of the bar," masters of good judgment and interstitial
adaptation of established norms.
In Harlan's case, the President and the Senate got what they paid for.
Harlan was a patrician in the Roman sense, combining blood and breeding
in a way that Cicero would have envied. The first Harlan in the New
World had served as Governor of Delaware in the year of our Lord,
1695.10 Marked out by his very name for service on the Supreme Court,
John Marshall Harlan did not let his family heritage transform him into a
social dinosaur. A man of great personal charm, he couldn't care less
about matters of social standing of importance to arrivistes. He reached
out for human contact with all who crossed his path.
But his immediate warmth and humanity only served as an
introduction. I myself worked as the Justice's law clerk during his later
years-at a time when he was sorely taxed by physical and family
8. For a more elaborate theory of judicial appointment, see Bruce Ackerman,
Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988).
9. Sandra Day O'Connor's selection was of the Brennan type. See id. at 1169.
10. See David L. Shapiro, Biographical Note to THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL
PILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. HARIAN xvii, xvii

(David L. Shapiro ed., 1969).
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difficulties that would have conquered lesser men. Harlan's response to
adversity was an eye opener for me. His courtesy and kindness were
admirable in themselves; but the better I got to know him, the more
remarkable his character seemed. To glimpse part of the picture, reread
Marcus Aurelius's Meditations. But there was another part of Harlan
that eluded Marcus: a genuine concern with the personal destiny of each
human being that had no analogue in classical stoicism. If there was a
judge capable of redeeming the common law model during an age of
constitutional independence, fate could not have selected a better man.
III. COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS?
So much for Harlan the man; the question remains whether he took
the right turn at the crossroads of legal method. Here are four reasons for
doubt.
A. Democracy
The common law method, when elevated to constitutional heights,
runs headlong into a legitimacy crisis. The familiar charge: common law
constitutionalism is antidemocratic. It is one thing to allow the common
law a subsidiary role in a system superintended by popularly elected
legislatures; quite another to support the common law judge when he
attempts to invalidate democratic legislation. And it doesn't help much to
hear the judge brag about his special situational sensitivities or the wisdom
of previous generations of ermined elitists stretching back in the mists of
Westminster Hall.
Constitutional independents like Hugo Black were right to keep this
basic legitimacy problem at the forefront of judicial consciousness. Rather
than mastering the elite mysteries of common law adaptation, the
independent judge squarely confronts the problem of democratic
legitimacy. Only by reflecting on the distinctive character of American
democracy can he hope to carve out a conception of judicial review
compatible with its democratic aspirations.
Black was also right in pointing out how independents might build a
democratic foundation for judicial review. The key was to keep distinct
two ideas that are too often jumbled together: rule by the People and rule
by a smallish number of politicians sitting in the halls of power in
Washington, D.C. and the state capitols. While our elected politicians
always pretend to speak in the name of the People, this is a trick
accomplished only rarely-by constitutional movements of the type
exemplified by the Founding Federalists and Reconstruction Republicans.
11. MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONIUS, THE MEDITAnONS (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1963).
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Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the name of the
People, movements like these first convinced an extraordinary number of
their fellow citizens to take their initiatives with a seriousness they do not
normally accord to politics; second, they allowed their opponents a fair
opportunity to organize their own political forces; third, they convinced
a majority of their fellow Americans to support their initiatives time and
again in a host of deliberative fora. Black was right to insist that the
distinctive feature of American democracy was its award of
superlegitimacy to spokesmen for popular movements that satisfy all three
of these demanding criteria. They, and only they, are granted the authority
to make supreme law in the name of the People-an authority not to be
confused with the normal legitimacy gained by ordinary politicians most
of the time.
It follows that courts do not act undemocratically when they test
normal statutes against higher lawmaking principles elaborated in the name
of the People at America's constitutional turning points. Instead, judges
are right to insist that normal politicians must earn the democratic
authority to transform the constitutional baseline by winning the kind of
mobilized and sustained consent achieved by the most notable
constitutional lawmakers of the past. It is Black's concern with preserving
these popular historical achievements that motivated his advocacy of the
independent constitutionalism sketched in my model.
Now there is, transparently, much to be said both for and against a
Blackian two track theory of American democracy." The crucial point
here is that John Harlan was entirely uninterested in contributing to this
conversation. He did not try to respond to Hugo Black's theory of.
democracy with a competing theory of democracy; he thought that judges
could make do without any self-conscious theory of American democracy
as they sought to make sense of the Constitution.
Wesberry v. Sanders3 provided a revealing exchange between Black
and Harlan on these matters. The case, as Black understood it, involved
the meaning of the requirement, .found in Section 2 of Article I, that the
"House of Representatives shall be . . . chosen by the People of the
Several States."14 For Black, this language could not be interpreted
without reflecting on the meaning of popular sovereignty, and the
importance of prohibiting our governors from insulating themselves from
the People by malapportioning the House of Representatives. 5
12.
(1981).
13.
14.
15.

For efforts to defend such a theory, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17.
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Harlan reacted to this suggestion with shocked disbelief, filing "the

most strongly worded" 16 dissent he ever wrote. 17 He refused to accept

the idea that matters of democratic principle were at stake in the
construction of Section 2. For him, Black's chosen text should be read

with all the emphasis falling on the concluding words: "the People of the
Several States." Interpreting the phrase as if it only involved a

commitment to federalism, not democracy, Harlan concluded that "the
People" of each State selected their Representatives regardless of how

malapportioned their voting districts might be.",
With some reluctance, Harlan recognized that Black was right in
pointing out that many Founders objected to malapportionment in
principle. 9 Rather than countering Black by developing a different

conception of democratic principles from these (and other) sources,'
Harlan excused himself from the task by pointing out that the Framers had

provided an explicit remedy for malapportionment: the grant to Congress,
in Section 4 of Article I, of the power to regulate state electoral
practices. 2'
16. This is the assessment of David Shapiro in THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 10, at 265.
17. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 20 (Harlan, I., dissenting).
18. See id. at 24.
19. See id. at 27 (admitting that "many, perhaps most, of [the Founders] also believed
generally.., that within the States representation should be based on population").
20. Given Professor Greenawalt's uncertainty on this score, see Greenawalt, supra
note 6, at 58-59, I should say that I think Black was quite mistaken in relying exclusively
on the language of Section 2, without integrating into his analysis other fundamental
principles brought into our higher law during Reconstruction. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at
8 & n.10.
Black's narrow emphasis did not, I think, justify Harlan in taking an even narrower
approach in dissent:
Since I believe that the Constitution expressly provides that state legislatures and
the Congress shall have exclusive jurisdiction over problems of congressional
apportionment [in Art. I, § 4], there is no occasion for me to consider whether,
in the absence of such provision, other provisions of the Constitution, relied on
by appellants, confer on them the rights which they assert.
Id. at 24 n.6 (Harlan, I., dissenting).
Harlan's reading of the Founding materials was no less narrow. While Black's
understanding of "chosen by the People" was informed by many sources, Harlan refused
to move beyond the formal text in order to understand its terms. He asserted that since the
text itself does not explicitly secure the right to vote, "so far asArt. I, § 2, is concerned,"
the state could set voting qualifications in any way it wished. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
21. See US. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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Harlan was right in noting that Article I, Section 4 expressly grants

Congress power over state election laws, and does not authorize judicial

intervention with equal explicitness. But Section 4 is no different from the
rest of the Constitution in this regard, which nowhere explicitly authorizes
judicial review. Harlan, of course, was perfectly aware of this, and given
his common law tendency to downplay such facts about the Founding, was
generally untroubled by the absence of an explicit textual base for judicial
intervention. In cases like Wesberry, however, he plays a very different
tune.' He insists that, unless he can find explicit evidence that the
22. Harlan's literalist and intentionalist approach in Wesberry is characteristic of the
approach he took to cases involving the malapportionment of state legislatures. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J.,dissenting). Of course, the
particular text relevant here is quite different: it is the Fourteenth Amendment, not Article
I, that is decisive. Harlan's approach, however, is identical. As in Wesberry, he claimed
that the declaration of fundamental principles announced by the Amendment-here
expressed through the language of "equal protection"-simply did not apply to legislative
reapportionment because the Framers took the extraordinary effort, in a subsequent section
of the Amendment, to fashion special remedies for denial of voting rights. For an excellent
opinion that explicitly lays bare the parallelisms in Harlan's approach to federal and state
problems, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Harlan's approach to the Fourteenth Amendment in Reynolds is, of course, on far
stronger intentionalist ground than his stand in Wesbeny. While there is no evidence that
the Founding Federalists explicitly considered and rejected the application of constitutional
norms to reapportionment, there is plenteous evidence that the Republican Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment were trying to be very cagey indeed about the application of equal
protection doctrine to black voting. Although Harlan tends to read this evidence with the
advocate's zeal to eliminate ambiguity, he is on much stronger ground here.
Even granting his (uncharacteristic) fealty to intentionalism, there remains a very large
problem with Harlan's analysis. This is posed by the existence of the Fifteenth
Amendment, which eliminates earlier ambiguities by explicitly granting voting rights to
blacks. Given this later explicit resolution, it is unclear why the earlier uncertainties
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment's application to black suffrage should constrain our
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, despite his general refusal to scrutinize reapportionment questions, even
Harlan made an exception for racially motivated malapportionments under the Fifteenth
Amendment. Thus, he joined the Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),
and repeatedly stated that racially motivated cases of vote dilution should be governed "by
entirely different constitutional considerations." Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58
(1964) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 335 (1962) (Harlan,
J.,dissenting) ("It is not inequality alone that calls for a holding of unconstitutionality; only
if the inequality is based on an impermissible standard may this Court condemn it.").
Harlan does not, however, explain what these standards should be or how dilution might
be measured in terms other than "one person, one vote." Even more fundamentally, his
willingness to tolerate this exception for blacks threatens to undermine his entire
intentionalist argument against judicial application of "equal protection" to reapportionment.
Speaking historically, the reason the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were anxious
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specifically

endorsed

judicial

intervention

on

the

malapportionment question, he would read Section 4 as if it explicitly
barred judicial review over such "political questions."'
It is odd to see Harlan playing the part of originalist in a dissent
against Black. It is odder still to see him play the game in its most

uninspiring form. It is one thing'to say, with Black, -that the Framers'
invocation of "the People" requires the thoughtful judge to reflect on the

democratic aspect of the Founding achievement and to bring these
reflections to bear in his assessment of the House of Representatives. It is

quite another thing to say, with Harlan, that merely because there is no
evidence (either way) on the Framers' intentions on a particular issue, we

should read a negative about the Courts into a positive grant of power to
Congress.24
At the very least, one would have expected Harlan to reflect upon the
structural flaw involved in assigning Congress principal remedial
responsibilities. The House, after all, will predictably be composed of
legislators who owe their positions to the practice of malapportionment.'
about extending "equal protection" to voting rights had to do with their uncertainty whether
most Americans in 1866 were prepared to grant the suffrage to blacks. These anxieties did
not prove lasting, and two years later the Republicans were indeed successful in gaining
explicit approval for black suffrage in the Fifteenth Amendment. Why, then, should the
Republicans' passing anxieties about black suffrage in 1866 authorize judges to cut back
the scope of "equal protection" they would otherwise afford to non-blacks in the electoral
process?
But Justice Harlan was not particularly interested in integrating the Fifteenth
Amendment into his understanding of the meaning of the Fourteenth. Indeed, as the years
passed, he increasingly tended to think of the two Amendments as if they had nothing much
to do with one another. In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), he argued
that since Congress rested the Voting Rights Act on the Fifteenth rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment, the key "case is not Reynolds v. Sims, but Gornillion v. Lighifoot." Id. at 589
(Harlan, J., dissenting). He then asserted, however, that the Fifteenth Amendment did not
reach cases of racially motivated vote dilution, for Gomillion "maintains the distinction
between an attempt to exclude Negroes totally from the relevant constituency, and a statute
that permits Negroes to vote but which uses the gerrymander to contain the impact of
Negro suffrage." Id. This narrow reading is not only inconsistent with Harlan's prior
interpretations, but those of Gomillion's author, Justice Frankfurter: "This is not a case
in which a State has, through a device however oblique and sophisticated, denied Negroes
or Jews or redheaded persons a vote, or given them only a third or a sixth of a vote. That
was Gomillion v. Lightfoot."- Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation

omitted).
23. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 30 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24: To use Paul Brest's helpful typology, this is not only originalism, but
intentionalism; and intentionalism of the least reflective kind. See Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
25. Harlan himself noted that the Court's equal-districts standard called into question
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Granting Congress exclusive remedial responsibility, then, puts the fox in
charge of the chicken coop.'

Even as a matter of remedial policy,

Harlan does not seem to have chosen the best place for a principled
refusal to grant judicial relief. One might, of course, try to support

Harlan's resistance on the grounds of prudence, not principle: the fear
that judicial intervention will be effectively resisted by the politicians

normally in charge of Congress and the state legislatures. This prudential
judgment, however, has proved incorrect, and in any event cannot account
for the bitterness of Harlan's opposition.
The Wesberry dissent provides evidence, in short, of an almost

Pavlovian aversion to encounters with the democratic aspect of our
constitutional tradition. Harlan's narrow and question-begging use of

originalist

techniques-techniques

that

he

characteristically

disdained-suggests the desperate lengths he would go to deny that

popular

sovereignty

commitments.

7 His

is one of our Constitution's

foundational

effort to peripheralize matters of democratic principle

the elections of all but thirty-seven of the then-sitting representatives. See Wesberry, 376
U.S. at 21 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 49-50 (appendix to Harlan's opinion
showing the wide disparities in district size in the states).
26. It is thus no accident that the principle of equal districts was repealed in 1929 by
the most malapportioned Congress in history-whose unrepresentative character was the
result of the unconstitutional refusal of Congress to reapportion seats in response to the
1920 census. See generally CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOcRACY DELAYED: CONGRESSIONAL
REAPPORTIONMENT AND THE URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920s (1990) (asserting that
Congress's failure to reapportion was in part a result of the urban-rural division in the
nation in the 1920s). While repealing this principle might have been part of a necessary
inducement to the Congress to go along with the need for a reallocation of seats after the
1930 census, it is odd to find Harlan treating this repeal by the malapportioned Congress
of 1929 as if it were deserving of deep judicial deference: "Mhe Court is not simply
undertaking to exercise a power which the Constitution reserves to the Congress; it is also
overruling congressional judgment." Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 42 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan also made odd use of the existence of slavery at the time of the Founding. He
admitted that Publius stated that "'lilt is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale
of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper scale of representation.'" Id. at 39
(quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 54, at 368 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
But according to Harlan, the "three-fifths compromise" showed that the Constitution did
not require representation based on population. It did so not by failing to count all men
equally, but by adding weight to the votes of those citizens living in slave states. Id. at 40.
Viewed in Harlan's way, the provision is not an ugly compromise abolished by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but is an expression of a practical understanding of representation
to which the Court owes fidelity.
27. Harlan's approach to questions of free speech and free association serves as a
useful foil here. In contrast to the narrow literalism of his reapportionment dissents, there
is a persistent insistence that the First Amendment "always involves a balancing by the
courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances
shown." Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959). In contrast to his blanket
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rule against any intervention in the most egregious cases of malapportionment, see, for
example, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 337 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting), there is a
pervasive emphasis on the imperative need for sensitivity to factual nuance. This
particularistic thread runs through his First Amendment opinions regardless of subject. The
appellants may be Communists or black activists or Vietnam protesters, the doctrines may
involve libel or obscenity, freedom of association or freedom of speech, but Harlan's
response is the same: "Every communication has an individuality and 'value' of its own
....
[I]n the nature of things every such suppression raises an individual constitutional
problem .... " Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
When we explore the way Harlan set the balance in these cases, a recurring pattern
emerges which broadly supports the theme developed in the text: the relatively low value
he placed on the role of the courts in supporting the process of democratic self-government.
While Harlan recognized this value in his approach to the First Amendment, it tends to be
subordinated to other governmental interests; indeed, he often conceived free speech or free
association as if it were a private interest in liberty that should be balanced against the
public interest in other values. He further skewed the balance by refusing to scrutinize
skeptically the governmental interests offered by the state to justify suppressions. Thus,
while he wrote an opinion for a unanimous Court barring Alabama's use of its corporation
laws to require the NAACP to reveal its membership lists, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), he reached a different result where other state laws seem
to have the same purpose and effect of suppressing civil rights activists. See Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investig. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 576 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(voting to uphold demand for membership lists by a state committee investigating possible
communist infiltration of NAACP); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 496 (1960) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (supporting a state law requiring public school teachers to disclose
memberships in organizations in a case brought by a teacher who lost his job after
disclosing membership in the NAACP); see also In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 34 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the state's interest in
"orderly processes of law" justified bar inquiry into an applicant's prior associations);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 463 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
state's interest in "maintaining high professional standards of those who practice law"
justified laws severely limiting the NAACP's ability to bring suits in state court).
A similar pattern is discernible in Harlan's responses to classic political dissenters.
While his opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), is a fine appreciation of
First Amendment values, see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590 (1969), there
are many more cases in which he allowed political expression to be outweighed- by other
governmental values he considered more pressing. See Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, I., dissenting) (arguing that interest in
"discipline and good order" justified schools in restricting nondisruptive expression of
students); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing that Selective Service interests in administration justified "incidental" suppression
of First Amendment rights of draft-card burners); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960) (upholding selective termination of Social Security payments to aliens deported for
prior participation in "subversive activities").
While Harlan tended to slight private interests when the public interest was on the side
of suppression, he sought to protect private interests when the public interest was on the
side of expression. Thus, while he joined the majority's revolutionary redefinition of the
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is even more striking when we compare it to the lofty place Harlan
accorded the common law in the constitutional scheme. Contrast, for these
purposes, the Justice's opinions in Harper v. Board of Elections28 and

Boddie v. Connecticut.' Harperinvolved an effort by Virginia to impose

a poll tax of $1.50 on any citizen who wanted to vote in a state election;

Boddie involved an effort by Connecticut to impose a filing fee of $60 on
any married couple who wanted a divorce. Harlan dissented in Harper.
Although he recognized that the justifications for the poll tax "ring hollow

on most contemporary ears," he excoriated the majority for "impos[ing]

upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism" by refusing to

allow money to ration democratic participation.'
Compare this with his opinion for the Court in Boddie. This time
Harlan was unimpressed with the fact that filing fees have a much deeper
history than poll taxes, going back to the practice of purchasing common

law writs in the early middle ages. 3' Moreover, if we expose these poll

taxes and filing fees to the test of reflective critique, the latter have far

more to be said for them than the former. As Harlan's opinion in Boddie
explains, it is perfectly "rational" for a state to "use

. .

.court fees and

process costs to allocate scarce resources."32 In contrast, the use of poll
taxes is a lot less rational from a resource allocation point of view: while

each extra lawsuit does impose measurable marginal costs on the judicial

First Amendment's limitations on common law libel in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), Harlan then took the lead in limiting the opinion's thrust when it came
to protectingprivate interests. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 96 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing Sullivan on the grounds that it did
not involve the infringement of any private interest protected by libel law); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 402 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (lowering Sullivan standard when
plaintiff has not voluntarily assumed the risks of public life); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (lowering Sullivan standard for public figures who are not'
"public officials"); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 62 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (reiterating his approach in Hill).
28. 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
30. Harper, 383 U.S. at 685-86 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. "Filing fees" date back before 1200, as receipt of the first royal writs of right was
predicated on a payment made to the King. See RAOUL C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF
THE ENGUSH COMMON LAW 26-27 (2d ed. 1988). The poll tax, on the other hand, had
virtually disappeared during the years leading up to the Civil War. By 1868, only
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island seem to have retained this exclusionary
technique. See Note, Disenfranchisement by Means of the Poll Tax, 53 HARV. L. REV.
645, 647 n.l1 (1940). The modem tax came into its own only as a response by Southern
states to the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment. See FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL
TAX IN THE SOUTH 2 (1958); Note, supra, at 647.
32. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381.

1991]

COMMON LAW CONS77TITION

system, the marginal costs of processing an extra ballot are just about

zero.
Nonetheless, Harlan was perfectly willing to uproot historic practices
and require Connecticut to provide free access to the courts in Boddie.
The opinion, I should add, is one of the finest examples of Harlan's
common law methods, and one of the few that gained majority support.
For the present, it will suffice to contrast his dissent from the Court's
decision in Harper to "adopt the political doctrines popularly accepted at
a particular moment of our history"33 with Boddie's quite different
understanding:
American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of
individual rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute
settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically placed
individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to courts, or
other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the
implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute
settlement.3
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this remarkable passage is the
casual way Harlan dropped his "of course." This "of course" cannot but
shock any democrat, who "bottoms" the "systematic definition of
individual rights and duties" on the political, not judicial, process. Given
Harlan's view of the matter, can it be any surprise that he failed to
character of his common law
confront the antidemocratic
constitutionalism?
This question gains more force'from the perspective of a quarter of
a century. Of all the Warren Court's initiatives, its egalitarian reform of
the electoral process has best stood the test of time. For all of Harlan's
dissents, the result has not been to "sapI the political process, " M but to
renew popular confidence in it. Thanks to these decisions, citizens will not
see their legislators respond to the 1990 census by cynically ignoring the
need to update constituencies in line with the ever changing patterns of
American mobility. Rather than tolerating malapportionment to safeguard
their hold on their preexisting constituencies, legislators will feel
themselves obligated to redraw district lines to keep them responsive to the
democratic will. I predict, moreover, that legislators will generally
discharge their democratic obligation voluntarily, without great need for
judicial intervention-suggesting how deeply these norms have been
internalized by the American polity.
33. Harper, 383 U.S. at 680 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
34. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375.
35. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 48 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Given this fact, any thoughtful proponent of common law
constitutionalism will have to grapple with the countermajoritarian
difficulty far more seriously than did Justice Harlan. It will not be enough
in the future to dismiss fundamental principles of democratic theory as if
they raised "political questions" for optional consideration by legislators.
Judges are under a constitutional obligation to interpret the requirements
of democratic principles in their ongoing assessments of the House and
other popularly elected institutions. But if democratic theory must inform
the Justices' ongoing relationship to the House of Representatives,
shouldn't it also be central when the Justices come back home and assess
the appropriate role of the Supreme Court? Harlan's untroubled
confidence in common law method seems a relic of the times when
Colegrove v. Green36 was the law of the land; if common law
constitutionalism is to be credible today, it can only be after a candid
acknowledgement of, and troubled response to, its antidemocratic
premises.
B. Liberty
It is no big surprise to learn that a common law constitutionalist has
turned a deaf ear to the problem of democracy. At least since the age of
Jefferson and Jackson, the professional judge has had a hard time
convincing his fellow Americans that he was just one of the boys, a
humble servant of democracy. In what other country in the world are so
many judges elected rather than appointed?
Instead of democracy, the common law's appeal has largely been
framed in terms of other values. From Joseph Story to Richard Posner,
economic efficiency has been an intermittent favorite. But by far the most
important boast of the common law has been liberty-the promise of a
sphere of freedom within which each of us might insulate ourselves, to
some extent at least, from the oppressions of political control by the
dominant faction.
As we have seen, this promise became a major problem for John
Harlan. The common law had wrapped up its language of liberty in
Lochnerian concepts of property and contract-and had thereby discredited
itself during the 1930s. Harlan, moreover, had absolutely no inclination
to refight the Roosevelt Revolution. His opinion for the Court in
Sabbatino37 took anti-Lochnerism to new frontiers by refusing to protect
Americans whose property had been seized without compensation by the
36. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). This case held that "the Constitution has conferred upon
Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States" as it "is hostile to
a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people." Id. at 553-54.
37. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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Cuban Communists. Moving closer to home, Harlan showed elaborate
deference to the new constitutional powers won by the national
government during the New Deal-too much respect. Over the powerful
protest of Justice Black and three other dissenters, he refused to shield
victims of McCarthyism from transparently punitive efforts by Congress
to deprive them of their Social Security pensions. 8 He was unwilling to
accord the "new property" even the modest kinds of protection that
owners of the "old property" had reason to expect from the postLochnerian constitutional order.
Nonetheless, it is wrong to think of Harlan as abandoning the common
law's tradition of liberty. Rather, he redirected it: away from its tradition
of market freedom, toward other social contexts less obviously
transformed by the New Deal revolution in constitutional law. His greatest
effort at reorientation was Poe v. Ullman, ° where he dissented from the
majority's decision to dismiss a challenge to Connecticut's birth control
statutes.
This opinion bears all the markings of the common law model I have
identified. By placing the problem in historical context, Harlan
downplayed the crucial turning points in American history-the Founding,
Reconstruction. His historical narrative is more open-ended and
diffuse-beginning with the Magna Carta, our law ripened, "long before
the adoption of that [Fourteenth] Amendment" into a tradition which
sought to defend rights "which are . . . fundamental."41 The heroes of
this tradition are judges, not constitutional lawmakers. The means by
which the tradition is to be defined is not abstract principle, but the
concrete weighing of particular interests by mature judges immersed in the
folkways of their society. Thus, Harlan went through great pains to reject
the idea that Connecticut's prohibition on the use of birth control devices
violated some abstract principle of liberty that protects each of us against
38. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See generally Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (comparing the Court's philosophy in
Flemming to the philosophy of feudal tenure). For other cases in which Justice Harlan
elaborately deferred to the discretionary powers of the welfare state, see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 418 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. See, for example, the modest protections afforded to the holders of "older"
property after Harlan's departure from the Court in Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking down a statute expanding the pension obligations
of private employers); U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating an
attempt by a state to repeal a covenant with state bondholders).
40. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 541.
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majoritarian moralisms."2 Such an approach, as Harlan was perfectly
aware, would call into question a host of state interventions regarding
"[a]dultery, homosexuality, and the like." 43 Although he was willing to
afford protection to married couples, he was quite unwilling to expose his
decision to Wechslerian tests of neutral principle: if married couples have
the right to sexual freedom in the privacy of their bedroom, why don't
homosexuals?
Harlan cut off such obvious questions of principle by rooting marriage
in a special narrative frame: "[T]he intimacy of husband and wife is
necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage,
an institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and
in every age it has fostered and protected."4 Note the appeal to "time
immemorial" so notable in the common law method at moments of stress.
It is this asserted universality of "marriage," as distinct from other
associations of equal intimacy, that allowed Harlan to cast these other
relationships beyond the sphere of liberty protected by the common law
constitution.
Having limited his field substantively, Harlan next narrowed it
procedurally. He conceded the state's broad power to regulate family
intimacies indirectly; it is only when the government invokes the criminal
law that the "obnoxious" character of the means, together with the
immemorially sacrosanct character of the relationship, requires judges to
call a halt. Surely, anyone cognizant of the Anglo-American tradition of
liberty should recognize at least this much?
Harlan expressed his judgment here, as in many other opinions,
through the constitutional language of "privacy. "45 Like its propertycontract predecessor in the age of Lochner, ' "privacy" functions in Poe
to define a zone within which each individual can defend his personal
freedom against state intervention. In Harlan's hands, the common law's
42. See id. at 545-47.
43. Id. at 553.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 408
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The personal interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment are those we attempt to capture by the notion of 'privacy' ,. . ."); Wiseman
v. Massachusetts, 398 U.S. 960, 962 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("Mhe individual's concern with privacy is the key to the dignity which is the
promuise of civilized sotiety."); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958) (discussing privacy necessary for preserving the freedom of association); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Mhe State has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of the home against
invasion of unsolicited obscenity.").
46. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S., 45 (1905).
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tradition of personal freedom reemerges, Phoenix-like, from its New Deal
ordeal, once again to provide a language through which Americans might
draw a line against the incursions of state power.
Putting aside my own doubts about his general project, I can only
admire Harlan's genius in redirecting this common law tradition of liberty.
I have no doubt he is right in suggesting that "privacy," not "property,"
provides the common law rhetoric that resonates best with the spirit of our
age. If we are to rely on common law methods to preserve our
constitutional freedoms, judges would be well advised to follow Poe and
build where the foundations are deepest.
Nonetheless, the manner of Harlan's execution of his privatistic turn
does serve to awaken, in me at least, further doubts about the present
viability of the common law project. To gain perspective, compare the
scope of common law liberty described in Poe with its scope in Lochner.
While I have no inclination to challenge the New Deal Revolution, I
nonetheless appreciate the extent to which Lochnerian principles of free
contract provided some genuine freedom for people to club together in
ways that their neighbors considered morally suspect or downright
diabolical. In contrast, Harlan's conception of common law freedom in
Poe is far less robust. He is prepared to guarantee privacy only to
conventional folk who satisfy the politically dominant view of an
acceptable intimate partner.
Perhaps I am judging Harlan too harshly here. While he lived to see
the majority heed his dissent in Poe, and confront the merits of the
Connecticut statute in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 7 Harlan left the Court
before it began extending the protection of privacy to the sexual intimacies
of unmarried people." It is always possible that, when reflecting upon
the possibilities of enduring intimacy in nonmarital relationships, Harlan
might have extended his concerns beyond the limited scope suggested by
his dicta in Poe. 9 Such is the way- of the common law.
Nonetheless, the libertarian growth potential of Poe seems modest-at
least when compared to the dynamic of "privacy" when it is interpreted
through the lens of the independent constitutionalist. To see my point, turn
from Harlan's opinions in the birth control cases' to Justice Douglas's
effort for the Court in Griswold.5 1 Like Harlan, Douglas was also
47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
49. Cf.Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (post-Harlan decision
holding that the definition of "family" for constitutional purposes is not limited to the
nuclear family).
50. While Harlan filed a special concurrence in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan,
J.,concurring), his major effort in this field was his dissent in Poe.
51. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
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responding to the New Deal's repudiation of Lochner by seeking to
redirect the libertarian aspect of the constitutional tradition into those
zones of life that seem most distant from the economistic logic of the
modem regulatory state; like Harlan, he too identified privacy as the legal
idea that would most credibly allow judges to sustain the libertarian aspect
of the constitutional tradition.

They differ only in the way they sought to elaborate this concept:
while Harlan's concurring opinion in Griswold relied on his earlier
common law effort in Poe, Douglas's majority opinion was largely written
on the model of the independent constitutionalist.52 Rather than offering

up a diffuse and open-ended vision of Anglo-American legal development,
Douglas focused on two of the great turning points of American
constitutional history: the Founding and the New Deal. While the
Founders undoubtedly relied on a property-oriented ideal of liberty,

Douglas tried to convince us that, after the New Deal, it is the concept of
privacy, not property, that best serves to organize many of the particular
concerns the Founders expressed in the Bill of Rights. 5" Rather than
following Harlan in focusing concretely upon the expectations surrounding
marriage, Douglas's principal aim was to look upon the particulars in the
Bill of Rights as grounded on a more abstract principle expressed by the
modem legal idea of privacy.
I have defended the merit of Douglas's form of independent
constitutionalism elsewhere.' For now, I want to compare its libertarian

potential with Harlan's common law approach to "privacy": which method
is more likely to yield a robust notion of constitutional liberty--one in
which unconventional, no less than conventional, people can enjoy the
protection-of a constitutional zone of freedom?
52. By describing Douglas's opinion as an example of independent constitutionalism,
I do not suggest that it is a pure type, without any admixture of common law elements.
In one famous passage, for example, he emphasized that he was dealing "with a right older
than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system."
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. The use of such rhetoric, however, should not disguise the
extent to which the opinion's basic argument tracks the model of independent
constitutionalism. I am not quite sure that Professor Gunther disagrees, but if he does, the
only way for you to resolve our dispute is by rereading the opinion in the light of the
competing models I have described.
More importantly, I do not mean to suggest that good opinions should try to strive for
"purity" by purging all elements that d'o not conform with one or another of my models.
The point of the models is to describe two very different aspirations, not to deny the
possibility of artful efforts to mix these aspirations into methodological wholes that are
larger than the sum of their parts.
53. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
54. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 536-45 (1989).
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The expansionary thrust of Douglas's approach seems pretty
apparent. Given Harlan's particularizing style, it seems a big step for him
to move from conventional marriage, hallowed by time immemorial, to
other forms of intimate relationship. In contrast, Douglas has generated his
privacy norm by isolating an abstract principle from the Founding texts.
This search for an abstract principle naturally disposes him to look much
more skeptically at ad hoe efforts to draw a strong line between the liberty
of conventional folk and the liberty of others.
Of course, no method by itself guarantees the robust protection of
liberty 5 5---it is even more important to have judges with a sound sense
of constitutional values. We are talking about a methodological tendency,
not a legal certainty. Nonetheless, given the present drift of jurisprudential
thought, it seems especially worthwhile to emphasize the link between
abstract reasoning and the protection of unconventional patterns of
behavior. While Harlan himself was quite comfortable with the relatively
tepid libertarianism generated by his method, particularistic modes of
adjudication are now trendy amongst academics who think that trashing
abstract styles of legal reasoning is the "progressive" thing to do. I am
quite sure, however, that John Harlan had a sounder grasp of the
pragmatic implications of a particularizing embrace of "situatedness" than
does Mark Kelman or Martha Minow. 6 In the hands of most judges,
contextualism will lead to the sanctification of the conventional at the price
of freedom for the unconventional.
We can now put our first two doubts together to build a cumulating
question about common law constitutionalism. I shall state my problem by
setting it against a commonplace of the conventional wisdom. This is the
view that sets our democratic aspirations in head-on conflict with our
concerns for the preservation of (private-regarding) liberty-the more
democratic we want our Constitution to be, the less we can expect it to
protect each individual's freedom to go his or her own way, and viceversa. In contrast, my claim has been that Harlan's version of common
law constitutionalism is inferior to independent constitutionalism on both
counts. It is more obviously inconsistent with democratic principle and
less robust in its liberty-protective tendencies-Pareto-inferior, as it were,
55. Black's dissent in Griswold suggests this much. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507
(Black, J., dissenting). Since this paper involves a broad contrast between my two models,
I shall not discuss the dispute between Black and Douglas-since this involves a (crucial)
inter-family dispute between rival conceptions of the model of independence. For some
preliminary reflections, see Ackerman, supra note 54. This question will be explored
further in Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CFH. L. REV. (forthcoming

1992).
56. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Martha Minow
& Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990).
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in the democracy-liberty space. Is it a mistake, then, to allow the common
law tradition to rule the modern Constitution from the grave?
C. Bureaucracy

My bill of particulars next proceeds to interrogate the common law
method by inquiring into its relationship to another fundamental aspect of
the modern American state-its increasingly bureaucratic character.
As I have already suggested, Harlan generally responded to the rise
of the activist administrative state with extreme deference, even when the
New Deal government used its powers in ways that transparently
oppressed unpopular minorities. 57 In his confrontation with ctiminal
procedure, however, Harlan did squarely address the problem of
protecting liberty under bureaucratic conditions. Once again, his
confrontation with the problem does not bode well for the future vitality
of common law constitutionalism.
I begin my story with the halcyon days of the 1950s, just before the
great revolution in criminal procedure. When Harlan came to the Court
in 1955, this body of law must have gratified his common law
sensibilities. Over the preceding generation, the Court had gradually
reinvigorated its constitutional commitments to fundamental fairness in the
criminal process-guaranteeing counsel in capital cases, scrutinizing
confessions for voluntariness, and so forth.58 Moving beyond the most
egregious cases, the Justices were developing an intricate fabric of
contextualized judgments-even though a confession was not extorted
through brute force, the courts were finding that one or another subtler
aspect of the interrogation deprived it of the requisite voluntariness; even
though the accused was not on trial for a capital crime, the courts were
57. In addition to Harlan's opinion for the Court in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603 (1960), see his dissent in Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
58. See, e.g., House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945) (defendant's right to a fair trial
includes the right to assistance by his counsel); Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)
(setting aside a conviction resting upon an involuntary confession as violative of due
process); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (requiring states to appoint lawyers for
indigent defendants whenever needed to ensure a fair trial); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940) (voiding murder convictions obtained by use of coerced confessions); Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding murder convictions resting solely on
confessions extorted by a state by torturing the accused void under the Due Process
Clause); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (announcing in dicta that convictions
obtained through the use of testimony known by the prosecution to be perjured violate due
process); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that a state's failure to provide
adequate legal representation in a capital case denied defendants' due process right to a fair
hearing).
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finding that one or another aspect of the situation seemed to make it unfair
for the defendant to go to trial without a lawyer; and so forth.
This was constitutional common law at its best: judges keeping
traditional frameworks meaningful through contextualized judgments
expressive of their culture's commitment to individual liberty. The
contemporary meaning of criminal justice could not be fixed by some
inspired act of constitutional lawmaking of 1787 or 1868 or whenever. It
was the ongoing product of efforts by the judges to deploy their carefully
trained intuitions in case after case.
Then came the revolution. In contrast to his root-and-branch
opposition to the democratic impulse behind the reapportionment cases,
Harlan's dissenting position on criminal procedure was far more
discriminating. He had no trouble joining the majority when it rejected
"clear" rules of an earlier day that were inconsistent with his situated
sense of social meaning. It was obvious to him, for example, that the
constitutional status of wiretapping could not be determined by considering
whether the police violated the defendant's property rights.59 However
clear the property line, it was beside the point of assuring constitutional
protection-which was to protect each American's "reasonable
expectations of privacy."' Such a formulation would, of course, require
judges constantly to immerse themselves in particularities to determine
when expectations of privacy were "reasonable." For Harlan, this was
hardly an objection. It merely suggested the vitality of common law
constitutionalism in the post-New Deal age.
In contrast, Harlan protested vigorously at decisions like Escobedo6"
and Miranda,6 2 which largely eliminated the need for judges to
investigate the voluntariness of confessions on a case-by-case basis. While
Harlan disagreed with some of the substantive value judgments made by
the majority in these cases, we should not ignore a deeper anxiety. I think
it is a mistake to call this anxiety "federalism" and chalk up his dissents
to his proverbial emphasis on states' rights. After all, the kind of case-bycase investigation of confessions that Harlan supported also involved an
intrusion upon states' rights. In many ways, this intrusion was more
abrasive because it was more dependent on unpredictable intuitions by
There was a more refined
federal judges concerning "voluntariness."'
59. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 360-61.
61. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
62. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 63. This was true under the habeas corpus principles announced in Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953), which authorized the federal district courts to review the
"voluntariness" decisions of the state courts even after the habeas petitioner had litigated
the matter in the state court system. Harlan accepted this fundamental decision in Brown

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

process question at stake: how should state police practices be
constitutionalized-by providing the police a set of clear rules or by
subjecting them to post hoc judicial supervision?
For Harlan, the answer was clear: the Supreme Court's new "code of
police practices"' threatened to peripheralize the common law judge in
the process of constitutional development. Judges simply could not design
sound rules without immersing themselves in particularities. Harlan would
accept abstract rules only when he was convinced that they were based on
the concrete experiences of countless judges.' All this is unsurprising
enough, given his general methodological commitments. And this is
precisely the reason we should ask whether the common law model makes
much sense in an increasingly bureaucratized world: won't common law
judges simply be overwhelmed by the need to make individualized
judgments in the thousands of cases thrown up each year by the modern
police state? Isn't it counterproductive, both in terms of effective law
enforcement and in terms of constitutional values, to gum up the
bureaucratic works with thousands of individualized judicial decisions
every year? After reading Harlan's many important dissents in this area,
I have not found a serious effort to confront this question-probably
because there really isn't any plausible answer. The brute fact is that ex
post judicial review of the thousands of fact-specific settings surrounding
confessions is a bureaucratic nightmare.
This is, I think, why today's Court-for all its shifts in the
conservative direction--has had so little inclination to rethink cases like
Escobedo and Miranda along the common law lines marked out in
Harlan's dissents. For all their abstract respect for Harlan, the new
conservatives on the bench are all too aware of the tension between the
pervasively bureaucratic character of the modem police state and Harlan's
vision of law as the custom-made product of judicial honoratores. Justice
Kennedy, for example, recently reaffirmed and extended the rule-like
character of Miranda in an opinion that provoked only two dissents.'
to expand federal jurisdiction, even as he rejected the further expansion of habeas in Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See id. at 460-62 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
64. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 594 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(defending the Court's holding by citing documents suggesting that "the judgment that the
presence of television in the courtroom represents a serious danger to the trial process is
supported by a vast segment of the Bar in this country"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 349-52 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (justifying the replacement of a "special
circumstances" test with a categorical rule by noting the process of "evolution" by which
the "Court came to recognize that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge
constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial").
66. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990). The Court's recent decision
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Rather than losing themselves and the police in a sea of fact-drenched
judicial determinations of "voluntariness," even a very conservative Court
is rightly unwilling to abandon the instrumental use of rules to control
bureaucratic justice.
Harlan himself kept control over the tension between common law
judging and bureaucratic justice by limiting the substantive values he was
willing to impose upon the operation of the bureaucratic state. The more
broadly one is concerned with harnessing the bureaucracy to fundamental
constitutional values, the more doubtful one must be about the virtues of
a common law method that insists that norms be generated through a
judicial confrontation with particular facts.
In contrast, the methods of independent constitutionalism do not suffer
under a similar disability. Rather than immersing herself in particularity
to gain a sense of basic value orientation, the independent looks backward
to the great principles of the Founding, Reconstruction, and other eras of
popular creativity, for enduring values. Having isolated these
constitutional principles, she may then proceed to define rules that might
productively assist in their implementation within an increasingly
bureaucratic society. No easy task, to be sure; but at least it remains
credible in a bureaucratic world in which Article HI judges cannot hope
to function as first-line law-appliers.
D. From Anglo-Gemeinschaft to Pluralist-Gesellschaft
My final doubt arises, perhaps paradoxically, when I reflect on the
remarkable way in which John Marshall Harlan fulfilled one of the central
requirements of the common law model. As we have seen, this model
places tremendous normative weight on the figure of the judge. It disdains
the hope of the independent constitutionalist, who looks to spokesmen for
the People, at rare moments of mobilized political consciousness, to hand
down fundamental constitutional principles for subsequent judicial
elaboration. Skeptical of the power of such abstractions to decide concrete
cases, the common law model places its bets on its ideal judge: sober,
thoughtful, immersed in the law of the cases and the folkways of the
country. Only such organic characters can be expected to discharge the
heavy duties of particularized judgment upon which the common law
model places so much weight.
But it is not enough for a judge to have the kind of organic character
required for the task of situated judgment; he must be perceived by large
in Arizona v. Fulmlnante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991), does not suggest otherwise. While the
Court held that the admission of coerced confessions may in some cases be harmless error,
it did not take it upon itself to undertake the laborious case-by-case task of determining
when confessions qualified as "coerced."
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segments of the community as possessing the requisite character. This
supposes, not to put too fine a point to it, deeply entrenched patterns of
deference-the masses must recognize, and defer to, the "better sorts"
trained to exhibit the right kind of organic character.
This is, it should be plain, a formidable job description. Indeed, it is
worth reflecting on why Harlan could play the role so effortlessly. His
confidence in his capacities as a common law judge flowed from the
rhythms of a life very different from that of the modern lawyer. He was
the ideal Princetonian of his day: chairman of the Daily Princetonian,
president of the Ivy Club-who could ask for anything more? After three
years at Balliol as a Rhodes Scholar, there was no need to compete with
the arrivistes at the Harvard Law School. He could move effortlessly to
the elite firm of Root, Clark and hone his talents at the New York Law
School that he loved throughout his career. He then followed his mentor,
Emory Buckner, when the latter was appointed U.S. Attorney of the
Southern District of New York by Calvin Coolidge. Through this old-boy
network, Harlan had become head of the Office's Prohibition Bureau by
the age of twenty-six, gaining an early opportunity to cultivate the distrust
of grand abstractions, grounded in the popular will, that marked his
mature jurisprudence. After his stint of public service, he could then
follow Buckner back to his white shoe firm and gain a rich legal
experience during the period most Americans call the Great
Depression.67
Little wonder this kind of gentleman should find common law
constitutionalism so congenial; this kind of gentleman created the common
law in the first place. But the truth is that John Marshall Harlan was a
throw-back even in his own time. Over the course of this century, the
legal elite has been increasingly populated by folks who got there the
modem way, taking test after test to get to the top of Harvard Law
School. These people would not have names like John Marshall Harlan;
nor would they have their buddies in the Ivy Club vouching for their
moral character. They became elite lawyers through good grades more
than good judgment. The modal character would shift toward analytic
smarts and harder work-away from the Anglo-Saxon gentleman and
toward the modern professional. Could these new men and women
function as organic characters in the traditional-or, at least,
neotraditional-way when they rose to the bench?
There are three different questions here. Would these new
professionals develop the kind of organic characters presupposed by
common law judging? Would they think of themselves as possessing such
characters? Would their fellow citizens think of them as possessing such
characters?
67. See Shapiro, supra note 10, at xviii-xxiii.
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Taking the first question first, I suppose one might be cautiously
optimistic if the only thing changing about big-time law practice was the
manner of recruitment: once Itzhak or Imelda from Harvard Law School
got to the real world of legal practice, they would still be obliged to test
their mettle in the good old way-giving thoughtful advice to clients.
After all, Harlan's right-hand-man during his years in private practice was
Henry Friendly-a new professional who was surely Harlan's equal in
lawyerly capacity to gain a considered view of a complex set of
particulars. I have very real doubts, though, that the bureaucratic megafirms of the present and future will be good schools for the cultivation of
such prudential virtues by the novo homines. These places afford ample
opportunities for analytic smarts, not to mention sheer drudgery, but they
rely too heavily on narrow specialization and the division of labor to yield
the kind of generalist good-sense demanded by the common law model."
Even if this were not so, it is emphatically not enough for the new
professionals to cultivate the classic generalist sensibilities. They must
think of themselves in the good old organic way: when they make a
decision, they must think of themselves as representatives of the American
tradition of common sense and fair play. This was no problem for John
Harlan, President of the Ivy Club. If he didn't speak for America, could
you please introduce him to the gentleman who was a better
representative? Things stand quite differently for the new professional
class. True, they got where they are through smarts and hard work, butisn't it a bit pretentious to suppose that working seventy-hour weeks on
mergers and acquisitions somehow qualifies one as privileged
spokesperson for the Volkgeist?W
In the unlikely event that our modem professional doesn't ask herself
this question, others surely will. Even the John Marshall Harlans of the
world recognize that they cannot count on the old deference in the new
American world of aggressive pluralism. If successful WASPS -have a
tough time gaining general deference for their particularized judgments,
there is no reason to suppose that successful professionals of other colors,
genders, and creeds will have it any easier.
I do not want to exaggerate. In a country where George Bush is
President, and David Souter is one of our most recent Justices, it seems
premature to announce the death of the class that has made common law
constitutionalism a substantial reality in America. But if we use the
68. See Bruce Ackerman, In Memoriam: Henry Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1711-13 (1986), for some more speculations about this problem.

69. The German is a backhand way of acknowledging the Weberian inspiration of
these remarks. Closer to home, they owe much to many conversations with my friend Tony

Kronman, whose forthcoming book speaks to these questions. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
LIVING IN THE LAW (forthcoming 1992).
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occasion of New York Law School's centennial to look forward a hundred
years, is it reasonable to expect many men or women like John Harlan on
the bench in 2091? Can future professionals be expected to sustain the
common law pretention of organic character-both to themselves and their
fellow citizens?

IV. TWILIGHT OR DAWN?
The country has come a long way over the past two centuries: from
a republic to a democracy, from a government by gentlemen to a
government by professionals, from a weak federation to a powerful
military-bureaucratic complex, from an Anglo-gemeinschaft to a pluralistgesellschaft. Throughout all this, we have largely managed to sustain the
rule of law-but only by repeatedly transforming the character of legal
method. How, then, to view John Marshall Harlan, that great dissenter?
Voice from the twilight or prophet of a new dawn?
While I admire the man, I doubt the method. My doubt, I should
emphasize, does not involve the question of ultimate ends. I am entirely
persuaded that the basic task of the Supreme Court is conservative, not
prophetic-to preserve enduring values, not to invent better ones. 0 The
question remains how this vital work of conservation is to proceed-which
of the complex strands of Anglo-American legal method will best serve to
define and defend enduring constitutional values in the democratic,
professional, bureaucratic, pluralist world of the future.
Of course, I haven't done much more than express some doubts.
Maybe common law constitutionalism, for all its faults, is better than the
alternatives. But maybe not.7

70. See ACKERMAN, supra note 12, chs. 3-6.
71. For my own best effort atindependent constitutionalism, see generally ACKERMAN,
supra note 12.

